Abstract-Intrusion detection plays a very important role in network security system. It is proved to analyze the payload of network protocol and to model a payload-based anomaly detector (PAYL) can successfully detect outliers of network servers. This paper extends these works by applying a new noise-reduced fuzzy support vector machine (fSVM) to improve the detection rate at lower false positive rate. The new noisy against fuzzy SVM is applied to analyzing 1-gram, 2-grams and 2 v -grams distribution classification of network payloads, which constructs three different intrusion detection models, respectively. These new intrusion detection models employ reconstruction error based fuzzy membership function to reduce the noisy of the data and to solve the sharp boundary problem, respectively. Experimental results based on DARPA data set demonstrated that the proposed schemes can achieve higher detection rate at very low false positive rate than the original and general SVM methods.
INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is an important component of infrastructure protection mechanisms for information security system. There are two main intrusion detection techniques: misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection uses the signatures of well-known attacks of the system to identify known intrusions. The main issue of misuse detection techniques is that it is not effective against novel attacks. On the contrary, anomaly detection has the ability of catching new attacks. Networkbased anomaly detection uses network traffic data to look at traffic addressed to the machines being monitored [1] . However, new legitimate behavior can be incorrectly identified as an attack, named false positive. One of the main goals of network anomaly intrusion detection is to reduce false positive rate.
The key issue of anomaly detection system is the higher number of false alarm, especial false positive alarms. Nevertheless, anomaly detectors are able to detect new attacks, whereas misuse detection could not. Network based anomaly detection can be applied at different levels: protocol header or packet payload [6] . In this paper, we focus on packet payload based network anomaly detection.
Payload-based network intrusion detection technique (named PAYL) is first proposed by K. Wang and S. J. Stolfo [2] . PAYL models the normal application payload of network traffic in a fully automatic, unsupervised and very efficient fashion [2] . It uses the characters of a profile byte (1-gram) frequency distribution and their standard deviation of the application payload flowing to a single host and port. To determine a payload is normal or abnormal, using Mahalanobis distance calculated the similarity of new data against the pre-trained scheme. The detector compares this measure against a threshold and generates an alert when the distance of the new input exceeds this threshold. The main shortcoming of PAYL is the high false positive rate.
More generic version of PAYL using n-gram distribution is also proposed in [2] . A sliding window of length n is used to extract the occurrence frequency in the payload of all the possible n-grams [7] . So the payload is described by a pattern vector in a 256-dimensional feature space. The n-grams method can partly generate sequence information of the payload byte. The sequence information may improve the detection precision comparing to the simple 1-gram frequency distribution model.
For the exponentially growing number of extracted features, the greater n the more difficult it is to construct an accurate detection model.
To solve the exponential increase of the dimensionality of the features space, R. Perdisci and others propose a new technique to extract the features Supported by Talents Research Foundation of Tianjin Polytechnic University from the payload that is similar to the 2-grams technique [7] , named 2 v -grams scheme. The 2 v -grams scheme is a bytes pairs with v bytes distance. To measuring 2 v -grams frequency distribution, a sliding window that covers two bytes which are v bytes apart from each other in the payload is employed. The 2 v -grams scheme does not add any complexity with respect to the original 2-grams technique and can be performed more efficiently [7] . By varying the parameter v, a new representation of the payload in different feature spaces can be constructed.
The false positive rate is the true limiting factor for the performance of IDS (Intrusion Detection System). The false positive rate of the IDS must be very low (e.g., as low as 10 -5 or even lower) [7] . Although fairly effectiveness, payload-based anomaly detectors like 1-gram, 2-grams and 2 v -grams techniques still suffer from relatively high false positive rate.
The goal of this paper is to develop several new payload-based anomaly detectors that improve the precision of detection rate at relative lower false positive by using fuzzy features of payload grams distribution. The main issue of payload based network intrusion is that of the higher false alarm, especial the higher false positive. There would be too many alarms if we raise an alarm every time when intrusion event found [22] . The key reason of most false alarms generated is the boundary problem. Firstly, at what degree of intrusion of payload alarms can be raised is often depends on different soft situation. Secondly, In fact, there is no clear (or hard) boundary between normal and anomaly gram distributions for network payloads. The use of fuzzy logic helps to smooth the abrupt separation of normality and abnormality grams distributions. For reasons above, fuzzy logic is very appropriate for using on intrusion detection, especially on payload based network intrusion detection.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a typical machine learning methodology based on statistical learning theory. The first feature of SVM is its good generalization ability of the learning model, which means even from a relatively smaller training data set, a good accuracy can be gain when SVM classification is used [22] . The higher generalization ability of SVM is very useful when it is applied to intrusion detection system for a great amount effective data is difficult to be gained and the normal behavior is always excursion sweetly. In addition, the SVM has the ability to overcome the curse of dimensionality. It constructs the classifier by evaluating a kernel function between two vectors of the training data instead of explicitly mapping the training data into the high dimensional feature space [22] .
A McPAD (Multiple Classifier Payload-based Anomaly Detector) is proposed by R. Perdisci and others [7] . McPAD is a new accurate payload-based anomaly detection technique that consists of an ensemble of oneclass classifier. They show that the scheme is very accurate in detecting network attacks that bear some form of shell-code in the malicious payload [7] .The main weakness of McPAD is it does not perform well when the attacks tries to spread the polymorphic blending attacks over several attack packets.
In this paper, we extend the works of payload based network intrusion detection by combing fuzzy logic and SVM classification technique. A new noisy against fuzzy SVM (fSVM) is applied to 1-gram, 2-grams and 2 v -grams distribution classification of network payloads. These intrusion detectors are named 1-gram-fSVMD, 2-gramfSVMD and 2 v -gram-fSVMD, respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed intrusion detectors have more detection rate at even very low false positive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we summarize the most relevant related works; whereas features extraction techniques are shown in section 3; the methodologies used in this paper are presented in section 4; Payload-fSVM-based intrusion detection models is shown in section 5; Experimental results and discussions are demonstrated in section 5; Conclusions and future works are summarized in section 6.
II. THE RELATED WORKS
There are two different approaches to intrusion detection systems (IDS): host-based detection and network-based detection. Host-based detection mainly uses routines that obtain system call data from an auditprocess which tracks all system calls made on behalf of each user. Network-based attack detection uses network traffic data to look at traffic addressed to the machines being monitored [1] .
Payload-based anomaly network intrusion detector, named PAYL, is one of the famous methodologies for network intrusion detection [2] . PAYL models the normal payload of network traffic by computing a profile byte frequency distribution and the standard deviation of the application payload flowing to single host and port. Byte frequency distributions serve as models for normal payloads. The model can achieve almost 100% detection rate with around 0.1% false positive rate for port 80. The key of the PAYL is the use of multiple centroids and ingress/egress correlation [3] . New features of PAYL anomalous payload detection sensor are demonstrated to accurately detect present to accurately detect zero-day worms [3] .
A service-independent payload processing approach is proposed in [4] , which is based on histogram representation. Three different options combining histogram representation and fixed width clustering algorithm for anomaly detection is implemented in [4] . This work gives us a conclusion that payload analysis can be used in a general manner, with no service-or portspecific modeling, to detect attacks in network traffic [4] .
Anagram methodology, contents anomaly detector that models a mixture of high-order n-gram (n>1), is designed in [5] . It is trained by storing all of the distinct n-grams observed during training in a Bloom filter without counting the occurrences of these n-grams. Anagram can detect significant anomalous byte sequences and generate robust signatures of validated malicious packet content. Randomized n-gram models make it difficult for attackers to build precise packet structures to evade Anagram even if they know the distribution of the local site content flow [5] .
AnPDPP is the other improved version of PAYL, which is considered one of the complete systems for payload based anomaly detection [6, 15] . CPP (Content based Payload Partitioning), which is used by AnPDPP, is a technique which divides the payload into different partitions depending on content of payload.
PcPAD (Multiple classifiers Payload-based Anomaly Detector) presented in [7] is novel accurate payload-based anomaly detection system. It consists of an ensemble of one-class classifiers. To solve the exponential increase of the dimensionality of the features space, PcPAD employs a new technique to extract the features from the payload that is similar to the 2-gram technique [7] .
Two techniques, feature differences (FD) and feature shading (FS), are proposed in [14] . FD identifies relevant string features of detected anomalies and FS highlights anomalous contents in network payloads. Generic techniques for visualization and explanation of payloadbased anomaly detection, which addresses the issue of previous techniques are originally opaque to security operator and provide no explanation for detected anomalies [14] .
A service independent payload processing approach is proposed in [16] , which increase detection rates in nonflood attacks. The conclusion is that payload analysis can be used in a general manner, with no service-or portspecific modeling, to detect attacks in network traffic [16] .
A keyword approach is proposed in [17] , which focuses on application level attacks. In [17] , the authors use principal component analysis to perform automatic dimension reduction in network packet fields and select the most appropriate ones for profile construction. Their experiments show that the advantage by extracting useful information from the packet payload for application level network attack detection.
Six different ADS (Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System) are evaluated in [18] . Three of them work on packet header only, while remaining three methods work on both header and payload. The conclusive comparison of these six ADS are given items of accuracy, complexity and detection delay and highlight factors to be considered while designing IDS in the future.
A lightweight Stateless Payload Inspector is developed in [19] . In this methodology, each network packet is characterized by a novel technique that efficiently maps the payload histogram onto a simple pair of features using hypercube hash functions. The two-dimensional feature space is quantized into a binary bitmap representing the normal and anomalous feature regions. These bitmaps are used as the classifiers for real-time detection [19] .
Ref [20] introduces a concept of layered version of ngram for payload based anomaly network intrusion detection. Each layer works as an independent anomaly detection system. A packet is regard as normal if it passing through all the layers, on the contrary, a packet is declared as anomalous if at any layer it is declared as anomalous and the packet further processing stops.
A simple payload based intrusion detection scheme is presented in [21] , which is resilient to contaminated traffic that may unintentionally be used during training. The results in [21] show that, by adjusting the two tuning parameters used in the proposed approach, the ability to detect attacks while maintaining low false positives is not hindered, even when 10% of the training traffic consists of attacks.
The above projects have their commonness and uniqueness. These projects use payload byte distribution, or combined sequence information n-gram distribution and 2v-gram distribution, or keywords information. Although the improvements of malicious detection based network payload are gained from these works, there are still rooms to improve the detection rate at the low false positive rate. For example, all these works are not considering the fuzzy boundary between legal behaviors and illegal behaviors. Fuzzy features are essential and ubiquity in all intrusion detection domains. This paper extends exist works of payload based intrusion detection scheme by applying fuzzy set theory. Another improvement is that we adopt a new improvement support machine (named fuzzy support machine) engine to gain satisfying detection rate at very low false positive rate.
III. FEATURES EXTRACTION FROM NETWORK PAYLOADS

A. 1-gram Distributions
One byte is regarded as a 1-gram in each network payload. So it contains maximum 256 different characters 0-255 in any payload [2] . Let C denotes a set containing all 256 characters, c i denotes i th character in C, f si denotes the i th character c i occurrence frequency in payload P s , F denotes a vector containing f si , and P s denotes a specific payload. We can obtain the following formulas:
Let P denotes a set containing M observed network payloads (training network payloads), then the average frequency for each 1-gram can be calculated as follow:
The standard deviation for each 1-gram can be calculated as follow:
B. n-grams Distributions
The n-gram Distributions are similar to 1-gram distributions, but the feature space is up to 256 n , not 256. A sliding window of length n is used to extract the occurrence frequency in the payload of all the possible ngrams. The n-grams extract bytes sequence information, which helps in constructing a more precise model of the normal traffic compared to the simple byte frequencybased model [7] .
An n-gram is a sequence of n adjacent bytes in a payload unit. A sliding window with width n is passed over the whole payload and the occurrence of each n-gram is counted. It reduces to 1-gram distribution when n=1. In fact, the features are the relative frequency of n-grams as follows [2] :
Where F is a feature vector which contains the byte relative frequency, b is a n-gram. The relative frequency of each n-gram is calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of each n-gram by the total number of ngrams.
C. 2 v -gram Distributions
In order to solve the exponentially growing dimensionality of feature space in the n-grams method, 2 vgrams method is proposed [7] . 2 v -grams are pairs of bytes that are v bytes apart from each other in the payload. Information related to the n-grams (n>2) [7] .
It is worth noting that for v=0 the 2 v -gram technique reduces to standard 2-gram technique. The distributions of 2 v -grams with different values of v represent different structural information about the same payload [7] .
IV. METHODOLOGIES
A. The Basic Support Vector Machine (bSVM )
bSVM is a classification method based on the idea of searching a hyper-plane. Suppose there are N training data
, where
. Considering a hyper-plane defined by ) , ( b w , where w is a weight vector and b is a bias. A new object x can be classified by the following equation [1] : 
B. The Fuzzy Support Vector Machine for Noisy Data (fSVM)
The optimal hyper-plane problem of the SVM can be solved by the modified version of the bSVM as follows [10] To improve the performance of the original fSVM, two approaches can be adopted [10] : One is to formulate the objective function in a different way to incorporate domain-specific knowledge; another is to select appreciate memberships for the specific data set. In order to remove the effect of noise in the data set, a membership function based on reconstruction error is adopted in this paper. The reconstruction error is the distance between a ddimensional data point i x and the principal component
be a sample set of input data; x W T X be a mapping point in the mapping space corresponding to the input point. The reconstruction error of a data point in the input space (from corresponding point in the mapping space) can be represented as follow [10] :
where X W is a matrix containing k principal components of covariance matrix of X as columns. For sparse data distribution, the kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) algorithm is selected. The KPCA algorithm contains two main steps: the first is to map the input data into a high dimensional space; the second is to apply the original PCA algorithm to the mapped space [10, 12] . However, sometimes the PCA fails for the dimensionality of the mapped space. In this case, there is an indirect method that using the inner product of two vectors in the mapped space.
be a data set in the mapped space. The reconstruction error in the mapped space can be calculated as follow [10] 
Where y µ and () k is the mean of y X and the kernel function, respectively. The matrix of W has k principal components of a covariance matrix of y X . The detail description and derivation of equation (4) can be found in paper [10] .
Using the reconstruction error )) ( ( x y e in equation (4), the membership function can be calculated as:
Where N σ is a free parameter and
is a function of rescaling on ) (⋅ e as follows:
where τ σ is the mean of the reconstruction error and The number of principal components k is determined by the profile likelihood method (PLM) [10] . PLM is a maximum likelihood method to find an elbow in the ordered sequence of eigenvalues.
V. THREE PAYLOAD-FSVM -BASED INTRUSION DETECTION MODELS
A. Payload Data Analysis
Network payload is only a stream of bytes or bits and it does not have specific format. In this paper, the least unit of payload is byte. Any byte value may appear at any position of the datagram stream. To analyze the byte stream distribution of the payload, the payload must be divided into smaller clusters or groups. The key problem is to find some specific criteria. According to paper [2] , the port number (or specific service) and the payload length are two obvious criteria. Different length payload always implies different types of payload, for example, the larger payloads are often containing non-printable characters indicative of media formats and binary representations (images, videos or other executable codes). Paper [10] gives the payload byte distributions about distinct ports from source and destination flows. They show that the distribution for ports 22 (inbound and outbound) does not have discernible pattern and for some ports, e.g. port 80, different length payload contains deferent distribution.
B. 1-gram-fSVM-based Intrusion Detection Model
Given a training data set, a set of models During detection stage, each incoming payload is scanned and its 1-gram distribution is computed. This new payload distribution is then evaluated by the well trained 1-gram-fSVM-based intrusion detection model.
C. 2-grams-fSVM-based Intrusion Detection Model
Similar to 1-gram-fSVM-based intrusion detection model, for each specific observed length i of each port j , the average 2-grams frequency and the standard deviation of each 2-gram's frequency are computed and stored in and Y k , using PLM; 4: Calculate the memberships by equation (9), (10), and (11); 5:
Run the fuzzy SVM with membership values above.
Algorithm 2 (Detection):
During the detection procedure, 2-gram relative frequency, the mean, variance, and standard deviation about new payload input is calculated. These features are sent to well trained 2-grams-fSVM-based model and the output of this model can determine the new payload is normal or abnormal.
D. 2 v -grams-fSVM-based Intrusion Detection Model
The average 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH DARPA DATA SETS
A. Data Preparation
In real network environment, each network services are assigned to a specific port number. For example, port 21 is assigned to FTP commands, port 23 is assigned to Telnet service, port 80 is assigned to WEB service, etc. Each service application use specific protocol and thus has its own payload type.
The length of each service payload is over very large ranges. For example, the TCP packets have the payload lengths from 0 to 1460. The larger payloads always contain non-printable characters (e.g., pictures, videos or executable files etc). For normalization, the length of each service payload is cut to 1000 bytes if the length exceeds 1000 bytes. Otherwise, the real length is adopted.
The experimental data set is extracted from DARPA 1999 Data Set. The DARPA'99 Data Set is the most complete dataset with full payload publicly available for experimental use. The data set consists of three weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. To compare to the original PAYL model, like paper [2, 7] , we also examine the inbound TCP traffic to ports 0-1023 of the hosts 172.016.xxx.xxx which contains most of the victims. On the other hand, ports 0-1024 cover the majority of the network services.
B. Training the Detection Models
All detection models designed above are trained by attack free data set and attack contained data set. The DARPA week 1 data set (which contains 5 days attack free) and week 3 data set (which contains 7 days attack free) are used to train the proposed model [2] .
Different port (service) payload has different n-gram distribution. For instance, the services at port 80 (HTTP) are less diversification than that at port 25 (Email). For each port, different fSVM models are constructed and trained respectively. In the experiment, the TCP traffic is considered only in training and test process. Because of this, the attacks that use any other PROTOCOL can not be detected in the well trained scheme.
For the proposed fSVM based models, the Gaussian kernel is adopted:
The kernel parameter σ and the regularization parameter C for the fSVM are selected using the grid search methodology [10] .
C. Experimental Results for 1-gram models
The testing dataset covers weeks 4 and 5, which contain 201 instances of 58 different attacks, 177 of which are visible in the inside tcpdump data.
We test the 1-gram payload based detection models on the four most commonly attacked ports 21, 23, 25, and 80. For each port, the average detection rate is calculated. The ROC curves of the testing models, covering the original 1-gram PAYL, 1-gram SVM and the proposed 1-gramfSVM are given from figure 1 to figure 4 , respectively. Figure 1 gives us that the proposed 1-gram-fSVM can get about 10% improvements comparing to 1-gram-PAYL in detection rate at false positive rate 0.5% to 1%. While the 1-gram-fSVM can also achieve 5% higher detection rate than 1-gram-SVM model at false positive 0.5% to 1%. These improvements are considerable for this simple model on port 21. figure 3 show us that in spite of the great increase of detection rate for port 23 and 24, the proposed model seems also not available for these two ports attacks detection. The key reasons are the content in the payload for port 23 is quite free style and some of the attacks are hidden well [2] . Figure 4 demonstrates that the 1-gram-fSVM can give much higher detection rate, about 15%-20%, than 1-gram-SVM and 1-gram-PAYL models.
D. Experimental Results for 2-grams models
We also test the 2-grams models on the four most commonly attacked ports 21, 23, 25, and 80. For each port, we compute the average detection rate like 1-gram testing methods. The ROC curves of the original 2-gram-PAYL, 2-grams-SVM and the proposed 2-grams-fSVM models are given from figure 5 to figure 8. Figure 5 (on port 21) shows us that the proposed method has higher detection rate than the original 2-grams-PAYL and 2-grams-SVM methods at the same false positive rate point. It also shows that the detection rate will be over 95% only at false positive rate 0.9%, while the detection rate of the original PAYL only achieve about 80% at the same false positive. Figure 6 (on port 23) demonstrates us that in order to acquire over 95% detection rate, one must endure the higher false positive rate. In the real intrusion detection system, higher false positive may not be accepted by administrators. So all models, including the original 2-grams-PAYL, 2-grams-SVM and the 2-grams-fSVM have too high false positive rate to the real network intrusion detection for port 23. Figure 7 (on port 25) shows that the detection rate of 2-grams-fSVM is only round 85% at false positive rate 8%. This result is even less than the detection rate on port 23. So the 2-grams-fSVM is not available on port 23.
From figure 4 (on port 80), we can get good detection rate at very low false positive rate. The result demonstrates that the proposed 2-grams-fSVM has great improvement of detection rate than the original 2-grams-PAYL and 2-grams-SVM for HTTP service.
We also give the comparison of ROC curves on port 21, 23, 25, and 80 in figure 5 for the proposed scheme. From figure 5 we can conclude that the most efficient detection rate is for port 80, and the less acceptable detection rate is for port 21. For port 23 and 25, all models are not very efficacious for the contents of port 23 and 25 payload are very free style and many of the attacks are well hidden [2] .
E. Experimental Results for 2 v -gram models
The distribution of 2 v -grams with different values of v gives us different structural information about payload [7] . Given different values of v, we can extract different sequences of bytes in payload. We extract different 2 vgrams distribution vectors for v=0, 1, 2, 3, 4. After training the different models by the extracted distribution vectors, the testing program is performed. We combine the five models (for v=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) to a union detection model. The testing program is based on the union detection model, named 2 v -gram-fSVM model. Figure 10 to 13 show us that detection rate ROC curves the union detection models on port 21, 23, 25, 80, respectively.
From figure 10 to 13, we can obtain that 2 v -grams based models have the similar trends of detection rate to 2 v -grams-PAYL and 2 v -grams-SVM based models. But the 2 v -grams-fSVM has much higher detection rate at the same false positive point than the other two models.
The most accurate model is 2 v -grams-fSVM for port 80 (see figure 13) , which gets over 90% detection rate at only 0.13% false positive rate. The second one is the 2 vgrams-fSVM for port 21, which achieves over 90% detection rate at 0.8% false positive rate. 
F. Effectts on detection rate of different v in 2 v -grams
Four detection models, 2 1 -grams-fSVM, 2 2 -gramsfSVM, 2 3 -grams-fSVM and 2 4 -grams-fSVM, are implemented and we give the analysis of different v effect on the detection rate. The experimental results are illustrated in figure 14 to 17.
It is well known that 2 v -grams with the larger v contain more sequence information and less frequency information. From figure 14 to 17, we can conclude that the larger v, the lower detection rate is. The conclusion reveals that the more frequency information may generate much positive impact on detection rate than that of sequence information. From experimental results, we obtain that the union of 2 v -grams models with different v has the ability of generalizing not only frequency feature, but also sequence feature distribution. This is the key reason that the proposed union 2 v -grams-fSVM has higher accurate detection rate than other models. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Experiments demonstrate that modeling the payload of network traffic to detection anomalies is feasible to protect servers against new intrusions. To improve the detection rate, a series new schemes based on fuzzy support vector machine (fSVM) are proposed in this paper. The new methods employs reconstruction error based fuzzy membership function to reduce the noisy of the data and to solve the sharp boundary problem. So the proposed models have more powerful detection rate at lower false positive rate than the original PAYL and general SVM models.
There are still some works to be studied in the future. First, more live network environment experiments for proposed methodologies will be done in the future; Second, we plan to measure the costs of the proposed scheme in the live network and test data set; Furthermore, ports and site specific payload combining models will be discuss for all network environment. 
